Inability or Illusion?
A Biblical and Philosophical Critique of Determinism and the Gnomic Will
Abstract
This article examines the internal inconsistencies within Calvinistic determinism, particularly its doctrine of total inability, and critiques St. Maximus the Confessor's concept of the gnomic will. Through exegetical engagement with Genesis 2–3 and other key texts, it argues for a libertarian understanding of human freedom that safeguards biblical moral responsibility, the capacity for spiritual discernment both before and after the Fall, and the integrity of pastoral care.
Introduction
Over two decades of pastoral and theological work, I've repeatedly encountered a troubling assumption: that human beings, after Eden, are utterly incapable of even recognizing their need for God without a prior act of regeneration. This deterministic anthropology, so often framed as humility before divine grace, risks undermining the very notion of human responsibility that Scripture insists upon. This article challenges a soteriological framework that, in attempting to preserve divine sovereignty, undermines the coherence of spiritual epistemology and human accountability.
Calvinistic/Augustinian determinism posits that after the Fall, human beings are entirely incapable of discerning or responding to spiritual truths apart from a unilateral act of divine regeneration. This doctrine, known as total depravity or total inability, is a cornerstone of Reformed soteriology. Adherents of this soteriology normally rely on the writings of John Calvin and St. Augustine. For example, Calvin wrote in his Institutes of the Christian Religion: “The will is so utterly vitiated and corrupted in every part as to produce nothing but evil fruits.”[1] Another well-known statement of Calvin's related to total inability is: “Man by nature is blind to spiritual things and utterly averse to seeking God, until his heart is changed by divine grace.”[2] From Augustine’s On Nature and Grace: “By the law of sin, the human race is so completely ruined that no one can be rescued from that ruin except by the grace of God.”[3] Augustine also wrote: “God gives not only the help of external preaching but also the inward call, which is suited to the will itself, so that it may be changed”[4] [emphasis added].
Even though these concepts are cornerstones of deterministic soteriology, proponents of this view claim epistemic assurance of salvation—that one can know he or she has been regenerated. This raises a logical tension: If fallen humans are spiritually blind and incapable of perceiving spiritual truth, by what means can anyone know they are saved unless their cognitive faculties were already intact? If spiritual perception is only granted post-regeneration, then no person could ever identify their regeneration as such without already possessing spiritual discernment—a classic case of epistemological circularity. This article demonstrates that such a system defeats itself by undercutting its own epistemological foundations. Further, while Eastern Orthodox theology does not affirm total inability in the same deterministic sense as classical Calvinism, its account of the gnomic will—especially as articulated by St. Maximus the Confessor—nonetheless introduces a postlapsarian anthropological division that parallels the Western notion of impaired volitional capacity.
St. Maximus has written, “The natural will is the desire for the good that is in accordance with nature, but the gnomic will is the deliberative faculty that chooses between options, and this latter arises from ignorance and contradiction after the Fall.”[5] And, “Before the Fall, Adam possessed only the natural will—united with the divine will. After the Fall, the gnomic will emerged as a manifestation of division within the human person.”[6] Maximus’ claim that the gnomic will arises only after the Fall, as a mark of disunity between natural will and divine intent, fails on exegetical grounds. The Genesis narrative clearly depicts deliberative choice prior to the Fall, indicating that such volitional dynamics are intrinsic to humanity, not a consequence of sin. Thus, the gnomic will does not salvage free will from determinism but rather risks obscuring the continuity of moral agency evident in Scripture. Therefore, this article argues that St. Maximus the Confessor's notion of the “gnomic will,” when used to support postlapsarian moral psychology, fails to align with the biblical witness of “pre-Fall” human agency.
A Biblical Examination of Total Inability
Several key texts are often marshaled to support total inability. Chief among them is 1 Corinthians 2:14, which states: “The natural person does not accept the things of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually discerned.” Calvinists interpret this verse as proof that humans cannot even begin to respond positively to God without prior regeneration. However, this interpretation ignores Paul's broader context, which is not about total inability to respond to the gospel, but rather about the immature Corinthian believers who were not receiving Paul's deeper spiritual instruction (cf. 1 Cor 3:1). In my own study and preaching through 1 Corinthians, I found it striking that Paul’s use of “natural person” is not a sweeping ontological condemnation of all humanity post-Fall, but a description of the immature or unspiritual mindset that resists deeper truths. Paul is rebuking a kind of pride—not pronouncing total inability.
Additionally, Acts 17:27 asserts that God placed people in their times and boundaries “that they should seek God, in the hope that they might feel their way toward him and find him.” This assumes some real ability to seek God, even among Gentiles, contrary to the Calvinist insistence on total depravity rendering all humans incapable of spiritual responsiveness. Further, Romans 1:18–21 strongly supports the argument against total inability by affirming that all people possess an innate capacity to perceive and respond to divine truth. Paul states that God's invisible attributes—His eternal power and divine nature—have been “clearly perceived” ever since the creation of the world, being understoodthrough what has been made. Consequently, humanity is “without excuse” because they knew God but suppressed the truth in unrighteousness. This implies that so-called fallen humans still retain enough moral and rational capacity to recognize God's self-revelation, contradicting the deterministic claim that spiritual discernment is entirely impossible apart from regeneration. The Genesis narrative also undermines the idea that humans were rendered completely incapacitated after the Fall. Adam and Eve, though disobedient, continued to hear God’s voice, respond to His questioning, and even attempt self-justification. There is no textual basis for asserting that the Fall rendered them spiritually comatose.
The Epistemological Undercutting Defeater
Herein lies the internal contradiction: if fallen humans are utterly incapable of recognizing spiritual truths until they are regenerated, and if knowledge of regeneration is itself a spiritual truth, then no one can know they have been regenerated. The system defeats the possibility of its own epistemic assurance.
Logical Syllogism:
P1: The unregenerate cannot recognize spiritual truths.
P2: The knowledge that “I have been regenerated” is a spiritual truth.
P3: Therefore, the unregenerate cannot know they have been regenerated.
P4: The regenerate must recognize spiritual truth to know they have been regenerated.
Conclusion: Therefore, no one can know they are regenerated—rendering Calvinist assurance not only inaccessible but logically incoherent.
This is a classic undercutting defeater. As Alvin Plantinga notes, any belief system that, if true, would destroy the rational basis for believing it, should be rejected.[7] Additionally, Randal Rauser, in addressing the problem of divine hiddenness, emphasizes that if God desires a relationship with humanity, He must make Himself sufficiently known. He writes, “If God exists and wants people to believe in him, then he must make himself known in a way that is accessible to human beings.”[8]
As a pastor, I’ve walked with individuals wrestling deeply with assurance. If Calvinism is right that no spiritual discernment exists prior to regeneration, then how could someone unsure of their salvation ever move toward assurance without already possessing it? The very pastoral act of helping people discern the Spirit’s work in their lives becomes theologically incoherent.
A similar critique extends to the Eastern doctrine of the “gnomic will” espoused by St. Maximus the Confessor. Maximus claimed that prior to the Fall, humans possessed only the “natural will”—aligned with the good—and that the gnomic will (the deliberative, choosing will) arose post-Fall as a sign of dividedness within the person. However, the Genesis account plainly describes Adam and Eve choosing between options prior to the Fall (Gen 2:16–17; 3:6). They exercised deliberative capacity. If deliberation and volitional choosing are evident pre-Fall, then the gnomic will cannot be a postlapsarian development. Thus, Maximus’ framework, while valuable in articulating certain aspects of synergy and theosis, is exegetically and anthropologically unpersuasive when applied to Genesis 2 – 3. A will that deliberates between good and evil was always present—it did not emerge as a deformity after the Fall.
In my view, the Genesis narrative offers a far more straightforward anthropology: humans were created with deliberative freedom from the beginning, and this capacity for rational choice was not the result of sin, but part of the imago Dei itself.[9]
Maximus’ “Gnomic Will”
St. Maximus the Confessor distinguished between the natural will (thelēma physikon) and the gnomic will (thelēma gnomikon). The former reflects the creature’s orientation toward the Good (God) as a natural potency; the latter, the deliberative aspect of decision-making in a fractured will.[10]
Maximus’ Christological goal was certainly to preserve Christ’s sinlessness and the divine-human unity. He was primarily battling against a heresy which taught that Christ had only a divine will. Maximus defended the orthodox doctrine of Dyothelitism as essential for affirming the full humanity and full divinity of Christ. In so doing, he held that the gnomic will was absent in Christ, who always willed in perfect unity with the Father.
A critical tension arises in Maximus the Confessor’s account of Christ’s human will, which he insists is genuinely human yet perfectly aligned with the divine will. This stance was formulated against Monothelitism, which denied the existence of a distinct human will in Christ, affirming instead that Christ possesses two wills—divine and human—in perfect harmony.[11] However, this raises a philosophical and theological challenge: if Christ’s human will is never in conflict or deliberation but always freely chooses the Father’s will, in what sense is it truly “human”?
Human freedom is commonly understood as the capacity to choose otherwise, including the possibility of error or rebellion.[12] If Christ’s will is incapable of choosing anything but the divine good, this appears to restrict his freedom to a flawless inevitability, which some might view as a logical failure or a “distinction without a difference.” The human will, while present, seems to lack the kind of deliberative freedom that characterizes humanity’s moral agency. Yet, proponents argue that this perfect unity of wills represents the highest form of freedom—freedom from sin and contradiction rather than freedom to sin.[13] This paradox highlights an ongoing tension in Christological anthropology: preserving Christ’s genuine humanity alongside his sinless divinity challenges simple notions of freedom and will, underscoring the complexity of Maximus’ doctrine and inviting further philosophical scrutiny. This tension must remain outside the scope of this article with only a few minor comments below. However, Maximus further suggested that the gnomic will emerged only after the Fall.[14] This claim falters under biblical scrutiny.
In Genesis 2–3, Adam and Eve clearly deliberated. They weighed the serpent’s words against God’s command. Eve “saw that the tree was good for food” and “a delight to the eyes” (Gen 3:6). Such language reflects evaluative reasoning—hallmarks of what Maximus would call gnomic volition. They assessed, weighed, and chose. If gnomic willing is postlapsarian, then this entire narrative is incoherent.[15]
Moreover, if Christ lacked a gnomic will while retaining a “human will,” yet still “was tempted in every respect as we are” (Heb 4:15), one must question what kind of moral agency is in view. Temptation without deliberation is mere spectacle. Further, if Christ “learned obedience through what he suffered” (Heb 5:8), it is difficult to see how Jesus had a purely non-deliberative will. It is more biblically faithful to say that Jesus chose rightly, not that he lacked the human capacity to choose otherwise. If the gnomic will truly only emerged after the Fall, then Adam and Eve's act of choosing could not have occurred in its supposed absence.
Therefore:
If Adam and Eve had a gnomic will, it is not a result of the Fall.
If they did not have a gnomic will, then they should have been incapable of deliberation or temptation (since they only possessed Maximus’ Natural Will)
But they were tempted and did deliberate, proving the presence of deliberative capacity prior to “the Fall.”
The conclusion is inescapable: the gnomic will, if it exists at all, is not a postlapsarian phenomenon. Its deployment as an explanatory mechanism for fallen moral psychology is unfounded and biblically unsubstantiated.
A Biblical Anthropology of Will and Choice
The Bible consistently affirms that human beings possess the epistemic capacity, grounded in God’s creative grace, to choose between moral alternatives. This capacity is not a defect caused by sin but a fundamental part of being made in the image of God.
Deuteronomy 30:19 – “I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore choose life, that you and your offspring may live.”
Joshua 24:15 – “Choose this day whom you will serve.”
Acts 17:27 – God “determined allotted periods and the boundaries of their dwelling place, that they should seek God... and perhaps feel their way toward him and find him.”
If God expects people to choose, then He must also have endowed them with the capacity to do so. To suggest otherwise turns divine exhortation into mockery.
Philosophical and Theological Implications
The determinism inherent in Calvinistic theology and Maximus’ account of the gnomic will ultimately undermines the coherence of moral responsibility. If human beings cannot genuinely choose the Good prior to regeneration, they cannot be held accountable. Likewise, if knowledge of salvation is inaccessible without already being saved, then no epistemic bridge remains to affirm one’s own standing before God. In contrast, a libertarian account of the will—where human agents can genuinely respond to divine initiative—is not only more biblically faithful but also philosophically robust. It preserves the integrity of moral responsibility, the intelligibility of divine justice, and the coherence of Christian epistemology.
Conclusion
The gospel invites real people to respond to a real Savior. In my years ministering in both academic, local church, and hospice contexts, I’ve found that people crave a theology that both affirms divine grace and respects human dignity. A deterministic system, however sophisticated, cannot do justice to the biblical witness—or to the lived reality of human longing, searching, and faith.
In both Reformed and some patristic frameworks, we find an overcorrection against so-called Pelagianism that ultimately robs humanity of genuine responsibility. The Scriptures portray human beings as capable of seeking God, choosing obedience, and bearing real moral responsibility. If the ability to discern and respond to spiritual truth is obliterated by the Fall, then divine judgment becomes unjust. Likewise, if the gnomic will is merely a byproduct of the Fall, we must ignore clear exegetical evidence of deliberation in Eden. A more coherent theological anthropology affirms the libertarian capacity to respond to God—not destroyed by the Fall. This framework not only aligns more faithfully with the Scriptural witness but preserves the moral accountability that determinism inadvertently erodes. Finally, this kind of libertarian anthropology opens greater ecumenical dialogue with Catholic, Wesleyan, Anabaptist, and Eastern Christian traditions that affirm synergy without determinism.
Bibliography
Adams, Robert Merrihew. Christ and the Moral Life: Essays in Biblical Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Augustine. On Nature and Grace. Translated by P. Holmes and R. Ernest Wallis. In Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 1st series, edited by Philip Schaff, vol. 5, 133–138. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994.
Blowers, Paul M. Drama of the Divine Economy: Creator and Creation in Early Christian Theology and Piety. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Edited by John T. McNeill. Translated by Ford Lewis Battles. 2 vols. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1960.
Constas, Nicholas. On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014.
Craig, William Lane. The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1999.
Flowers, Leighton. The Potter’s Promise: A Biblical Defense of Traditional Soteriology. Trinity Academic Press, 2017.
Maximus the Confessor. Disputation with Pyrrhus. In On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, translated by Paul M. Blowers and Robert Louis Wilken, 101–104. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003.
———. Ambigua to John. Translated by Nicholas Constas. In On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua, vol. 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014.
Tollefsen, Torstein Theodor. The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
[1] John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vols. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1960), 1:265 (2.2.18).
[2] Calvin, Institutes, 1:272 (2.3.6).
[3] Augustine, On Nature and Grace, trans. P. Holmes and R. Ernest Wallis, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 1st series, ed. Philip Schaff, vol. 5 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), 133.
[4] Augustine, On Nature and Grace, 138.
[5] Maximus the Confessor, Disputation with Pyrrhus, in On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, trans. Paul M. Blowers and Robert Louis Wilken (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003), 101–3.
[6] Maximus, Disputation with Pyrrhus, 104.
[7] Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 359–364.
[8] Randal Rauser, “The 59 Second Apologist: The Argument from Divine Hiddenness,” Randal Rauser (blog), December 4, 2014, https://randalrauser.com/2014/12/the-59-second-apologist-the-argument-from-divine-hiddeness/.
[9] For a similar but less critical engagement, see Paul M. Blowers, Drama of the Divine Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 147–49. My view differs in that I see Maximus’ bifurcation of the will as exegetically unnecessary and philosophically problematic.
[10] Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 102–120.
[11] Nicholas Constas, On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), Ambigua 7, 15; cf. Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 110–115.
[12] See Robert Merrihew Adams, Christ and the Moral Life: Essays in Biblical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 74–76; and William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1999), 45–48.
[13] Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 117–120; Maximus’ view is that true freedom is freedom from sin and division rather than mere capacity to choose between good and evil.
[14] St. Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua to John, trans. Nicholas Constas, in On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), Ambigua 7, 15; cf. Opuscula theologica et polemica, PG 91.52C–53A.
[15] See also critique in Leighton Flowers, The Potter’s Promise (Trinity Academic Press, 2017), 87–94.